【报告人简介】

夏烁，哈勒经济研究所研究员、莱比锡大学助理教授，2018 年获鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学金融学博士。目前主要研究领域为公司金融、公司治理与劳动经济学。研究成果发表在Journal of Finance、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 等期刊，研究成果多次被Financial Times、Institutional Investors、Columbia Law Schools’ Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets、Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance、Financial Regulation 等媒体报道。

【内容摘要】

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity grants. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted the crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.

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撰稿：王杰审核：胡蓉单位：高等经济研究院