东北财经大学-科研处
学术讲座
实验经济学系列讲座:胡贤华
发表时间:2017-01-03     浏览次数:337     发布人:王俊

报告题目:Selling Multiple Units:An Experimental Study

报 告 人:胡贤华(University of Amsterdam)

报告时间: 2017年01月05日(周四)09:30-11:00

报告地点:博学楼422室

主办单位:科研处、实验经济学实验室


【报告人简介】

胡贤华(Audrey Xianhua HU),荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学经济学博士,阿姆斯特丹大学副教授、丁伯根研究所研究员。

胡贤华教授的主要研究领域为Autions、Incentive Theory、Mechanism Design、Corporate Finance。胡教授已先后在Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic behavior、International Journal of Industrial Organization等国际重要经济学期刊发表学术论文多篇。

 

【报告摘要】

Motivated by real-life examples, we analyze four auction mechanisms for selling m identical objects to n (>m) bidders with unit-demand: sequential first-price auction (SFPA), sequential second-price auction (SSPA), discriminatory auction (DA), and uniform auction (UA). Under bidder risk aversion, we show that the expected revenue from the SFPA (DA) is higher than that from the SSPA (UA), and find consistent results in a laboratory experiment. Furthermore, as predicted by our risk aversion model, we observe the “declining price anomaly” in sequential auctions. Lastly, though our theory predicts that the expected revenue from DA is higher than that from the SFPA, we observe the opposite results in the experiment and a behavioral model that incorporates heterogeneous belief can rationalize our data.

                                                      

科研处、实验经济学实验室
2017年1月3日



撰稿:邹化勇 冯珍珍审核:王志强 宗计川单位:科研处 实验经济学实验室